Abstract -For a cognitive radio network (CRN) in which a set of secondary users (SU) competes for a limited number of channels (spectrum resources) belonging to primary user, the channel allocation is a challenge and dominates the throughput and congestion of the network . In this paper, the channel allocation problem is first formulated as the 0-1 integer programming optimization, with considering the overall utility both of primary system and secondary system. Inspired by matching theory, a many-to-one matching mechanism is used to remodel the channel allocation problem, and the corresponding PU proposing deferred acceptance (PPDA) algorithm is also proposed to yield a stable matching. We compare the performance and computation complexity between these two solutions. Numerical results demonstrate the efficiency and obtain the communication overhead of the proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) was introduced by Mitola in 1998 as a promising approach to alleviate spectrum scarcity and improve the spectrum utilization efficiency. It allows the unlicensed or secondary users (SUs) to dynamically access the vacant licensed spectrum of primary users (PUs) without the authorization of operators/administrations [1] . To realize cognitive radio networks (CRNs), channel allocation should be adapted according to the varying channel states and requirements, predefined quality of service (QoS) of users and other criterion [2, 3] . The main purpose of channel allocation is assigning the usable channels or time-frequency chunks to SUs.
The channel allocation problem is difficult because it is a combinatorial integer programming problem of matching SUs to channels. Even in its simplest case, i.e., assign one channel to SUs, it cannot be solved easily or in closed form. This complexity can rapidly increase when the size of the networks growing. At the same time, the global network information and centralized control are required, thus yielding significant additional overhead and complexity.
Recently, matching theory [ 4 ] has emerged as a promising technique for allocation problem, which can overcome some limitations of the existing method [5, 6] . Matching theory is a Nobel Prize winning framework, which is suitable approach to model the interactions between agents in two distinct sets. Most references, such as [7, 8] , focus on matching theory in microeconomics. Similarly, the association of channels and SUs can be described by matching theory.
In this paper, we focus on the channel allocation mechanism design aiming at maximizing the social welfare [ 9 ] / overall utility. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model, and formulates the channel allocation problem as a 0-1 integer programming problem. The problem is reformulated as many-to-one stable matching game in Section III. Simulation results and analysis are presented in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cognitive radio network with a set
of SUs pairs and a set of orthogonal
licensed to PUs. The total number of SUs K =  , where  is the cardinality of the set  , while the number of channels L =  . The PUs are the spectrum resource owners and have the thresholds of QoS requirements in their allocated frequency bands. Each PU's channel is allowed for one SU to share, while one SU can access several channels simultaneously. We assume that the maximum channel number that a user S k can access is q k , which is determined by the performance of SUs' transceiver and economic budget. The system model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . . If the lth channel is allocated to the kth SU,
Due to each channel can be only allocated to one SU, then we obtain the constrain that
In addition, since user S k can access at most q k channels simultaneously, we have another constrain, i.e.,
A. Utility function of the secondary system
Considering the activity of primary channels, the average achievable rate in bit/s/Hz of user S k on channel C l can be formulated as (1 ) log 1 ,
where the first term in the above summation is the average achievable rate when the channel C l is vacant and the second term is the average achievable rate when the channel is occupied, i.e., SU transmission with the PU simultaneously under a tolerable power. σ is the noise variance, and 0 l C P is the probability of the channel is vacant, which is expressed in (4) .
We assume the status of channels follow a Markov process, which change between vacant and occupied. Let 
Hence, the total average achievable rate of user S k in this CRN can be regard as his utility function, which is represented by
x is the element of matrix A which satisfies the constraints (1) and (2), and
u C is defined previously in (3). We utilize
B. Utility function of the primary system
Apparently, the channel C l prefers user S k which will pay higher fee for using, and the transmission rate of PU on this channel decreases in interference power
is the channel gain between secondary transmitter S k and the primary receiver on C l . Accordingly, the utility function of channel C l can be formulated as 2 2 2 log 1 ,
where
≥ is the fee paid by user S k , and
there is no SU active on this channel.
C. Centralized optimal solution
The overall utility of this network is the summation of all SUs' and PUs' utilities, which describes the interest of a network operator/administration. In economics, this function is also called social welfare [9] , and can be represented by
,
where λ is a weighted coefficient which can be utilized to increase the priority of one objective to the other, and
. If λ is close to zero, the network pays more attention to primary system performance, while if λ is close to one, the secondary system performance is prioritized. In this way, the overall utility will not be dominated by the utility of either side of the users. Hence, the channel allocation problem is considered to maximize the overall utility, which is formulated as
There are three constraints in the above optimization problem. Constraint (C1) ensures that the status of channels only includes two cases: vacant and occupied. Constraint (C2) guarantees per channel can be allocated to one SU. Constraint (C3) means a SU S k can access multiple channels and the maximum number is q k .
We note that (8) is a 0-1 integer programming problem with exponential computation complexity, which is N-P hard, and the complexity will increase with the network size. The classical Hungarian algorithm can be applied to solve this problem in centralized manner [10] , however, a coordinator is needed to perform the calculation and dictate the channel assignment. We will propose a distributed solution which can achieve a similar performance with lower complexity in next section.
The results, which are actually a centralized solution, will be used to compare with the stable matching algorithm in Section IV.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To solve the proposed channel allocation problem, we propose a novel approach based on matching theory. Matching theory originally stems from economics, which is a suitable mathematical framework to analyze and optimize the allocation problem among users and spectrum resources [5] . The merit of matching theory lies in it can provide a distributed solution with tractable computation complexity.
In essence, a matching game is a two-sided assignment problem between two disjoint sets of agents, in which each individual of a set has preferences over the individuals of the opposite set [4] . 
A. Channel allocation as a matching game
We first present the important definitions by extending some notations and definitions from previous works in [11, 12] , which are applicable to channel allocation in CRN. Definition 1. A many-to-one matching μ is a mapping from the set ∪   into the set of all subsets of ∪   such that for every k S ∈  and l C ∈  : 1) ( ) q ∈ are associated with SUs. The above definitions imply that the outcome matches the individuals on one side to those on the other side. The propositions 1) and 2) satisfy the constraints (C1) and (C2), respectively. As we mentioned above, the solution of matching game is stability concept instead of optimality. Next we will introduce related definition of stability. the SU nor the SU is unacceptable to the spectrum resource. Such a matching is also said to be un-blocked by any unhappy agent. . In a nutshell, the pair will be said together to block a matching μ if they are not matched to one another at μ , but would both prefer to be matched to one another than to (one of) their present assignments. Definition 4. A matching μ is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or any SU-channel pair.
So far, the basic notations and definitions of matching theory have already introduced, in the next subsection we propose an efficient algorithm to solve the matching game, which can provide stable results.
B. Proposed algorithm
In this subsection, we modify the firm proposing deferred acceptance algorithm in [13] to solve the channel allocation problem, which can be extended from the oneto-one stable matching situation. We map the orthogonal channels to be the workers, and the SUs to be the firms, since each channel is allocated to one SU while each SU can hold multiple channels. The PPDA algorithm describes in Algorithm 1 can be applied to solve problem (8) their preferences and quotas (Line 10 to 18), then feed back the results to corresponding PUs. Finally, the matching process ends when all primary channels are allocated, and this status is a PU-optimal stable matching which is weak Pareto optimal. Furthermore, while the status of network changes, Algorithm 1 will be implemented once more.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Considering a CRN in a 300 m×300 m square area to numerically evaluate the proposed algorithm, the number of orthogonal channels L=10 and the number of SUs K ranges from 1 to 6. Each SU's access ability, i.e. the quotas k q is assumed equal to 2. The distribution of users is shown in Fig. 2 , which is generated randomly, with solid dots donating transmitters, hollow dots representing receivers. The PU's transceivers are in red color, while the SU's transceivers are in blue color.
We simply assume the transmission power of PUs is set to 5 W, and the distance between each PU's transmitter and relative PU's receiver is identical for all as 100 m. Similarly, the transmission power of SUs is set to 1 W, and the distance is equal to 80 m. The wireless fading channels are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) and Rayleigh distribution with the coefficient 0 1 λ = , the path-loss fading component
The setting of rest parameters are provided in Table I.  TABLE I  THE SETTING In simulations, we fix the number of channels and compare stable matching algorithm with the maximal social welfare, maximal SUs utility and maximal PUs utility. These three allocation mechanisms are under different number of SUs, which the optimization objective is to maximize the overall utility, SUs utility and PUs utility respectively. In addition, we use the random matching mechanism as the benchmark to compare with the above mechanism. In the random allocation mechanisms, we assign channels randomly to SUs under the constraints on k q , and the simulation results are the average of 10 6 times. Fig. 3 shows the social welfare of the network while the number of SUs ranges from 1 to 6. Apparently, the stable matching mechanism and maximal utility mechanism achieve higher value of social welfare than random matching mechanism. In our scenario, the PUs utility occupies a predominant position in overall utility function. Hence, the maximal PUs utility mechanism almost achieves the same value of maximal social welfare. The stable matching mechanism performs slightly worse than the maximal social welfare, for example, when the number of SUs K=3, the social welfare are equal to 2.93 and 2.66, respectively (roughly 9.2% worse than the maximal social welfare method). Moreover, we observe that as the number of SUs increasing, the gap between these two methods decreases. However, the first three mechanisms belong to 0-1 integer programming optimization, which have higher computation complexity and increase exponentially over the network size. While the complexity of stable matching algorithm is ( )
where K L × is the number of possible SU-channel pairs. Fig. 4 shows the utility of PUs while the number of SUs varies. The curves in this figure are similar to Fig. 3 due to the significant situation of PUs utility in (7) . With the increasing of the SUs number, stable matching mechanism can achieve better utility level, even is equivalent to the maximal social utility.
In Fig. 5 , the first four mechanisms achieve less difference in SUs utility. Especially, the values of stable matching and maximal PUs utility are almost the same since the PPDA algorithm is PU-optimal, which means the PUs will benefit much more from matching. Fig.6 shows the number of proposals per channel under stable matching game scheme for increasing number of SUs. Obviously, while the number of SUs is much smaller than the available channels, i.e. preferred SU becomes more competitive. It can be observed that channel C 3 and C 8 propose only once all the time due to the distinctive preferences of these two channels. By calculating the preferences of this matching game, we obtain that the first choice of channel C 3 and C 8
is SU S 3 , and the preference of SU S 3 is { } 8 3 , , S S  . Hence, we can conclude that SU S 3 will engage the first proposals from channel C 3 and C 8 . in our simulation setting, where channel resources are unable to satisfy the SUs' requirements, the average number of proposals decreases. Note that there exist some SUs only matched with one channel, and channels have more SUs to choose in such case. Hence, a few average number of PU proposals are needed for our PPDA algorithm. Furthermore, we can estimate the additional communication overhead according to Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 due to the adoption of stable matching scheme. It is reasonable to assume that PU l C proposes through an M bit message to its preferred SU, and the preferred SU responds this proposal via an N bit message. Hence the communication overhead can be calculated as 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the matching theory is applied to model and address the channel allocation problem. The overall utility considers the utility of both secondary system and primary system. The 0-1 integer linear programming algorithms optimize the channel allocation problem of three different goals. Then we model this problem as a stable matching game once more, in addition, the corresponding PPDA algorithm is proposed to reach the stable states with lower computation complexity. Simulation results verify the efficiency of this mechanism and present the possible communication overhead.
